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Introduction
This article explores different faces of the concept of assent that can be 
found in the history of Western philosophy. The development of this 
concept coincides with the shaping of epistemology and its vocabulary, 
with assent, belief, faith and holding for true sometimes appearing as 
synonyms of one another. It is not my intention here to go into detail 
about the complex relationships between these concepts, which partake 
not only in general theory of knowledge but also in moral and religious 
epistemology. Instead, my aim is simply to briefly trace the outline of 
some significant contributions to this theme. My overall goal is to bring 
to light deep connections that are obscured by the use of different ter-
minologies to depict essentially the same cognitive processes. I shall 
thus provide a mosaic of views put forward by various authors belong-
ing to distinct periods and, in many cases, seemingly irreconcilable 
schools of European thought. These views, I argue, can be profitably 
exploited today if we identify their common features. 
Let us start from the beginning. The roots of assent lie in the Greek 
idea of synkatathesis, which plays an important role in the Hellenistic 
period. According to the Stoics, in particular, to assent is to form a 
cognition that determines what is given in perception. This cognition, 
they believed, is somewhat constraining leading to the notion of “uni-
versal assent”. What this means is that everyone in the same position 
as myself would have to assent to the same that I do, i.e. that their 
perceptual faculties would constrain them in the same way that my 
own perceptual faculties constrain me. The sceptical worry about 
whether we are actually capturing what we take to be real would in 
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this way vanish. But there is a caveat to this presumption. If there were 
a complete match between our sense impressions and reality, then there 
would be no freedom of judgment and consequently no freedom of 
belief, which seems intolerable. Hence there must be a capacity to 
assent or withhold assent according to the rational evaluation we can 
make in each situation – one that for the sceptics always remains incon-
clusive. Franz von Kutschera writes apropos of this problem:  
The Stoics said that the step from an impression, that something is the case, 
to the judgment, that it is indeed the case, is an act of assent which they 
termed synkatathesis (adsensio), a decision to accept the impression as 
correct. Now in judgments we express our beliefs. Therefore we cannot say 
that in our judgments we are free, but not in our beliefs. Beliefs, then, are 
neither impressions nor determined by them, but are also formed by an act 
of assent, of synkatathesis. (von Kutschera, 1994, 28) 
Medieval philosophers such as Aquinas and Suárez extended this 
understanding to Christian theology, making use of the word assensus 
to characterize a voluntary act of the will that is mandatory for faith. 
Commenting on Aquinas, Jude Dougherty points out that “faith is then 
defined as a personal act of assent to propositions acknowledged to be 
true but for which there is not sufficient scientific or philosophical evi-
dence” (2003, 40). That is the reason why Suárez associates faith with 
opinion given that there is no epistemic sufficiency for the claims made 
by the intellect in matters of religion. While these contributions are 
significant, epistemology is not so much their central focus. It is only 
with the advent of British empiricism that assent regains its epistemo-
logical significance.
This concept is central to the work of Locke, assuming a pivotal role 
in his An Essay Concerning Human Understanding published in 1690. In 
this book, Locke explores the nature of assent focusing on various 
epistemic operators. This examination goes back to 1671 when we find 
two drafts for Locke’s masterpiece. The first bears the Latin title Intel-
lectus humanus cum cognitionis certitudine, et assensus firmate whereas 
the title of the second is already close to that of the final version: An 
Essay Concerning the Understanding, Knowledge, Opinion and Assent. 
Rejecting an innatist perspective, Locke’s goal is to give an account of 
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the origins and limits of human cognition, analyzing what he calls “the 
grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent” (2008, I.i.2). In his 
view, none of these possess the status of knowledge, with assent 
encompassing both belief and opinion. Knowledge as such is limited 
to judgments that are absolutely certain, with this resulting in what 
Peter Anstey aptly calls “a form of imposed epistemic boundedness” 
(2013, 33). Since the majority of our propositions about reality lack the 
firmness of indubitable knowledge, it is probability as the higher 
approximation to truth that rules our assent, one that articulates 
human praxis with its moral and religious dimensions. What is more 
interesting in Locke, following the lead of the Stoics, is in fact the way 
he looks at assent as possessing not merely a theoretical meaning but 
also a practical application. Hence the weight attributed by Locke to 
what he calls “wrong assent, or error” (2008, IV.xx.1-18) for this 
involves a misuse of our capacities to recognize what is probably true 
and act accordingly. 
Hume is another author for whom the idea of assent is central in his 
philosophy. In A Treatise of Human Nature, which appeared in 1739-40, 
Hume equates “assent” with “belief” and analyzes the way this natural 
operator lies at the bottom of our everyday practices (cf. 2007, 1.3.5 ff.). 
Assent presents itself with an irrecusable force which nonetheless shall 
not prevent us from questioning its solidness. Scepticism, in the eyes 
of Hume, is therefore unavoidable from a rational point of view. Yet 
this is not to say that experience is really doubtful. There is always 
uncertainty, but habit shows that any dubitative efforts collide with the 
strength of what is immediately perceived or assented. For Hume, 
assenting, or believing, is what governs the totality of our actions. The 
consequences of this doctrine are particularly threatening for morality. 
Thus Russell Hardin writes that “Hume has no moral theory, only a 
theory of the psychology of our moral views” and emphasizes that this 
“cannot be satisfactory for anyone who seeks ‘true’ moral positions” 
(2007, 28). However, can we actually talk about truth in Hume? His 
teaching is that truth is something we practically, albeit not rationally, 
cannot do without because it is crucial in our decision-making. This 
also holds for religious dogmas. Even if Hume considers that religion 
is incompatible with reason, it belongs to the natural history of man.
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Hume is not the only author of his time concerned with these issues. 
Emphasis on religious assent can be found in the writings of “minor” 
authors such as George Stanhope and Samuel Johnson. The way John-
son employs the word “assent” in his 1754 The Elements of Philosophy 
deserves special attention. After presenting “knowledge”, “certainty” 
and “evidence” as not depending on our assent, since what they involve 
are “those Truths which are necessary and immutable”, Johnson dis-
tinguishes between opinion and faith, dividing the latter into human 
and divine (cf. 1754, 77). What defines opinion is our assenting to a 
mere possibility extracted from the nature of things. Human faith, in 
turn, is explained by Johnson in terms of testimonial belief, which car-
ries more or less confidence according to the credibility of the testi-
mony. What remains unquestioned throughout history is a matter of 
“moral certainty” (ibid., 78). Finally, divine faith is reserved for a moral 
assurance which is “grounded upon Reason” (ibid., 79) and does not 
leave room for doubt.
These are important approaches to the concept of assent, but we 
would have to wait a few more decades to find a detailed treatment of 
its intricate epistemological connections with other concepts, which are 
located at the crossroads between theoretical and practical reason. This 
was the work of Kant to whom I now turn.
Kant and His Critics
Having also received inspiration from Wolff, for whom assensus is 
equivalent to the free act of faith, Kant focuses on assent, or “holding 
for true” (Fürwahrhalten), in his three Critiques and in other texts, 
notably his 1800 Lectures on Logic. Kant’s articulation of the matter 
will provide the framework for all subsequent inquiries about this 
theme in the German-speaking world. Kant opens the discussion 
about this topic in his Critique of Pure Reason, published in 1781, by 
making reference to what he calls “objective grounds”, on one hand, 
and “subjective causes”, on the other (cf. 1998, A820/B848). His view 
is that we are at risk of mixing up what simply arises from human 
subjectivity with what is factually objective, something that results 
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in an illusory holding for true. However, to recognize this illusion is 
not an easy task because, Kant avers, we only have knowledge of 
phenomena, not of things in themselves. He affirms that there are 
three degrees of taking to be true, namely “having an opinion” 
(Meinen), “believing” (Glauben) and “knowing” (Wissen) (ibid., A822/
B850). An opinion is considered by Kant to be insufficient both objec-
tively and subjectively by virtue of lacking epistemic justification. 
Belief also possesses objective insufficiency but enjoys validity for the 
person who decidedly adheres to a certain proposition. In a different 
way, knowledge lies in an objectivity that is epistemically unshakable. 
Given that, for Kant, apodictic knowledge can only be achieved 
through theoretical self-evidence, belief acquires a privileged status 
within the practical sphere.
In the First Critique, Kant will conceive of belief in three different 
ways, which parallel the three modes of holding for true. A belief can be 
“pragmatic” if what is fuelling it is of a doxastic nature resulting in an 
instrumental decision; it can be “doctrinal” in cases of pure theoretical 
speculation; and it can be “moral” if it respects moral law as something 
the subject postulates in order to act in agreement with values that are 
taken to be universal (cf. ibid., A824/B852 ff.). In this sense, the idea of 
“moral belief” matches the very concept of Fürwahrhalten, in the midst 
of which free choice is its highest expression (cf. ibid., A828/B856). In 
Kant’s view, there can be no moral knowledge for providing infallible 
rules of conduct. The only possibility of human action rests on a com-
promise the subject establishes with something that has but an assertoric 
strength.5 
This conception will be reinforced in the Critique of Practical Reason, 
which appeared in 1788, where, re-examining the notion of taking to 
be true, Kant stresses the role of duty in our praxis. His strategy is to 
contrast the mere subjective inclination to behave in a certain way with 
what he terms a “need from an absolutely necessary point of view” (1996, 
5.143). In agreement with the definitions provided in the First Critique, 
5 Only a judgment anchored to “objective grounds” can be considered apodictic and represent a 
source of knowledge. Guy Longworth explains this well by saying that “what we hold true for 
practical purposes is to be viewed, from a purely theoretical perspective, as a mere hypothesis” 
(2017, 265).
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the idea is to explore a sphere of universality, which is recognized as a 
practical necessity. As Sorin Baiasu put it, “the bases of the assent that 
are valid for me can be tested on the understanding of the others to see 
whether they have the same effect on them” (2013, 31).
As a corollary of his system, Kant dedicates the final paragraphs 
of his 1790 Critique of the Power of Judgment again to the question of 
holding for true, namely to the kind of belief that is not anchored to 
any objective grounds but nevertheless can guide our actions on the 
basis of “trust” (2000, 5.471). Andrew Chignell demonstrates keen 
insight when he remarks that “Kant leaves room for another kind of 
firm assent that has nonepistemic grounds or merits that are sufficient 
to make it rational in particular contexts, even if it doesn’t have 
sufficient objective grounds” (2007, 333). However, despite its nov-
elties, Kant’s project is marked by a teleological understanding of 
humanity, which raises a number of issues belonging not only to 
moral but also to religious epistemology. In particular, one may won-
der whether people holding different reasonable beliefs should nec-
essarily converge in the same direction, which poses the problem of 
value-disagreement. The “spectre of relativism”, in Axel Hesper’s 
phrase (2010, 318), is for Kant simply a symptom of blindness 
towards the universal good, which can be achieved if individual 
interests are put aside and truth acknowledged in the form of a 
practical postulate.
Contending against the Kantian perspective, Bolzano re-evaluates 
the notion of holding for true in his 1837 Theory of Science. This work 
aims to establish the logical pillars of science searching for objective 
laws, which, by definition, do not depend on our recognition of them 
to exist. One of the main contributions made by Bolzano is his theory 
of “propositions in themselves”, which he associates to that of “truths 
in themselves” (2014, §§19 and 25). A proposition in itself is what 
underlies any possible proposition that can be expressed or merely 
thought by us. What matters to Bolzano is reality as such and not the 
way human beings subjectively represent it. As a consequence, truth 
does not result from our propositional acts but imposes itself upon the 
world, with error corresponding to our incapacity to identify what the 
case is. Whereas Kant, as Robert Theis notes, “insists on the subjective 
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character of Fürwahrhalten” (2010, 221) as encompassing opinion, 
belief and knowledge, Bolzano excludes the latter from it.
Bolzano’s view is that only opinion and faith constitute expressions 
of our taking something to be true, the difference between them lying 
in a weaker or stronger adherence to the content at issue. He extends 
this view to the traditional laws of thought – excluded middle, identity 
and non-contradiction – as properties that belong to reality itself and 
not just to our mental capacities. For Bolzano, these laws, more than 
logical, are ontological, something that had also been flagged by Wolff. 
We are thus in the presence of a realist epistemology that sees the threat 
of scepticism in Kant’s critical philosophy, which is especially manifest 
in the dichotomy phenomenon/thing in itself. To say that our phenom-
enal knowledge can never reach things in themselves is to open the 
door to sceptical claims that in the end lead to a solipsistic standpoint. 
According to Bolzano, it is clear that our knowledge attributions 
involve an acquaintance with the external world, albeit partial given 
the impossibility of each time taking all aspects into account, and are 
not the product of a phenomenalism.
This has important practical consequences, with Bolzano applying 
his realistic doctrine to the moral and religious spheres. His aim is to 
fight relativism in these domains by searching for principles that are 
independent from particular circumstances at both an individual and 
a collective level. Bolzano’s writings explore new avenues for thinking 
about these questions using the notion of “natural morality”, dis-
cussed in his Treatise of the Science of Religion, as a background (cf. 2007, 
199 ff.).
Strongly influenced by Locke and, like Bolzano, regarding Kant as 
a subjectivist, Newman published An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of 
Assent  in 1870. Here he speaks of three possible ways to enunciate a 
proposition, an “interrogative”, a “conditional” and a “categorical” 
one, which he associates with three “modes of holding propositions” 
(1985, I.i.1). These are the mental acts of doubt, inference and assent. 
Newman also makes a distinction between “notional” and “real” 
apprehensions, relating inferences, as “conditional acts”, to the former 
and “assents”, as “unconditional”, to the latter (cf. ibid., I.i.2). This 
conceptual landscape plays a decisive role in Newman’s understanding 
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of the praxis of religion. One can believe in a dogma, Newman avows, 
in two diametrically opposed ways: “To give a real assent to it is an act 
of religion; to give a notional, is a theological act.” (1985, I.v) It is very 
interesting that for Newman the “real” assent operates on the basis of 
what he calls “religious imagination” while “notional” assent “is held 
as a truth, by the theological intellect” (ibid.). There is thus a primacy 
of religion over theology, a conception that is of the greatest importance 
if we look at the number of internal incompatibilities within some con-
fessions, including Christianity.
What the Grammar of Assent investigates are the epistemic condi-
tions for a “real” assent, in contrast with a mere “notional” form of 
apprehension. This has obvious implications for morality, with “con-
science” appearing as the cornerstone of Newman’s approach. He 
opposes “moral sense” to “sense of duty” (ibid., I.v.1). The first is what 
enables us to reflect on what is the best thing to do on a certain occa-
sion, with our rationality acting in benefit of a practical orientation. 
But when it comes to duty, “a rule of right conduct” is not at issue any 
longer; what is essential is “a sanction of right conduct” (ibid.). This, 
Newman believes, is to be accessed in terms of good or bad conscience, 
to which he attributes an emotive character, anticipating current trends 
in the philosophy of emotion. If Bolzano talked about “natural moral-
ity” as the backbone of a sustainable society, Newman vindicates “nat-
ural religion” as a key to inform both ethics and theology (cf. ibid., 
II.x.1). 
The Analytic and Continental Traditions
The theme of assent is no less prominent in the rise of “analytic” phi-
losophy. Frege, whose views are in many ways reminiscent of Bolzano’s, 
set forth his conception of logic in clear opposition to the psychologism 
defended by Erdmann in his 1892 Logic (Elementary Doctrine). In the 
first volume of his Basic Laws of Arithmetic, published in 1893, Frege 
maintains that logical laws can only bear on “laws of truth” or “being 
true (Wahrsein)”, whereas psychological laws have to do with “laws of 
takings-to-be-true (Fürwahrhalten)” (1964, 13). Frege forcefully rejects 
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the view that mental processes characteristic of psychology can inter-
fere with the immutability of logic. He is convinced that “general valid-
ity” should not play a role in logical matters for the simple reason that 
truth will remain untouched even if it is taken by everybody to be false. 
What is true, Frege insists, corresponds to something independent from 
our judgments and not to subjectivist expressions, as psychologists 
would have it.
Of course this is based on the assumption that the logic of thought is 
unchangeable, something that is by no means consensual in contem-
porary science. Frege extends his view of logic to an objectivist theory 
of linguistic meaning, where the “sense” of our sentences is not the 
result of a compromise between subjective representations but is fixed 
by the objective nature of “thought” (cf. 1956). For Frege, as bearers of 
the capacity of thinking, we can apprehend thoughts and hold them 
for true or false, even though the content of these thoughts belongs to 
no one in particular and is true per se. Authors such as Charles Travis 
have highlighted in Frege “[t]hought’s social nature” (2011, 304) as 
occurring within specific forms of life, a leitmotif of Wittgenstein’s later 
philosophy.6 However, the problems posed by intercultural communi-
cation show that we need a much more powerful framework for the 
explanation of thought-expression.
Following in the footsteps of Frege, Husserl, the father of phenom-
enology, will also severely criticize psychologism in the Prolegomena 
to Pure Logic, the first volume of his Logical Investigations, published 
in 1900. Husserl, who had himself endorsed a psychologist view in 
earlier writings, deepens the Fregean critique of Erdmann stressing 
the sceptical relativism that can arise from an anthropological approach 
to the laws of thought. Husserl’s strategy is to demonstrate that even 
the hypothetical inversion of our operation of “holding for true” (für 
wahr halten) in a “holding for false” (für falsch halten) would have no 
6 Tyler Burge goes as far as to argue that “[t]he later Wittgenstein took up Frege’s remark that 
recognition of objectivity or shareability in linguistic expression centers ‘in the deed’” (2005, 34). 
I concentrate on Wittgenstein below.
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repercussion in the truths and falsehoods themselves (cf. 2001, 1, Pro-
legomena, §40).7
This, for Husserl, does not apply only to logic but also to epistemol-
ogy. Hence, to conceive of a subjectivity of truth as applied not merely 
to individuals, with their mental processes, but to the species, which 
could suffer a bio-logical mutability, is vehemently discarded by Husserl. 
Timothy Mosteller recalls that “Husserl’s main point is that any rela-
tivistic claim in which truth is relative to the constitution, or any other 
feature (including epistemic standards) of the human species, involves 
itself in a contradiction” (2006, 23). What Husserl tries to show is that 
there are evidences that cannot be recognized in psychological terms.
In the first part of the second volume of Logical Investigations, titled 
Investigations towards a Phenomenology and Theory of Knowledge, which 
appeared in 1901, Husserl studies exactly what remains objectively 
subjacent to our intentional acts, with his analyses vindicating a dis-
tinction between the sphere of truth and the psychic experience of the 
contents at stake. There we can see that his approach is not identical 
to the Fregean one. As Martin Kusch highlights, “whereas Frege 
reduces psychologism to idealism and solipsism, Husserl attacks psy-
chologism as a radical form of empiricism” (1995, 62). The fifth inves-
tigation is especially relevant, with Husserl introducing a whole set of 
concepts, among them that of “positing acts”, to characterize our tak-
ing to be true, or belief, in contrast with the “imaginative” ones we 
perform (cf. 2001, 2, V, §§34-40). The influence of phenomenology on 
Heidegger’s philosophy put Husserl on the side of “Continental” 
thought and consequently as a foreigner to mainstream analytic schol-
ars. However, we can see that there were central concerns shared by 
the founding fathers of the two main currents in contemporary philos-
ophy, Frege and Husserl.
7 It should come as no surprise that the notion of Fürwahrhalten also makes its appearance in 
Nietzsche’s writings. As Peter Bornedal reminds us, truth is, for him, “that which we call truth, 
that which we decide is and designate as truth, that which we hold-to-be-true” (2010, 53). In the 
Posthumous Fragments, Nietzsche refers to degrees of holding for true in connection with 
degrees of doubt and mentions the notion of Fürwahrhalten alongside that of für-Unwahrhalten, 
“holding for untrue”, within the context of a discussion about our faculty of judgment (cf. 
1988, 103). His idea is that we should indeed take as untrue all artificial constructions, doing 
away with the very concept of truth, and build a novel social organization based on a will to 
dominance.
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Another important contribution along these lines to the understand-
ing of our holding for true was made by Wittgenstein. In his later phi-
losophy, Wittgenstein reconsiders the impact of Frege on his 1922 
Tractatus logico-philosophicus, which assumed a strong anti-psychologist 
stance in regard to logic. The concept of Fürwahrhalten is used in Witt-
genstein’s Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, written in the 
1930s and 1940s, no longer with the negative charge that can be found 
in Frege (cf. 1978, I, §§131-54). The way Wittgenstein employs the term 
points to a novel understanding of logic, which is no longer limited to 
basic operators such as truth-functionality, quantification and identity, 
but is now seen as underlying all spheres of human reasoning. As an 
expression of our “language games”, which take place within contex-
tualized forms of life, the holding of something to be true becomes a 
focal point of interest on the way to an evolutionary conception of logic 
or “evolutionary normativity” (Venturinha, 2015, 165).
In connection with this view, Wittgenstein dedicates significant 
thought to the application of Fürwahrhalten within the religious domain. 
He emphasizes that what the believer primarily takes for true is some-
thing that exceeds the mere “historical” facts and is sharable with other 
individuals (cf. 1998, 37-38), in a view clearly reminiscent of Newman 
(cf. Venturinha, 2019, 107-10). Emphasis on Fürwahrhalten is also to be 
found in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, prepared between 1949 and 1951, 
where we witness the all-embracing character of logic in the midst of 
which “there is no sharp boundary between propositions of logic and 
empirical propositions” (1974, §319), with the former corresponding to 
rules that are embedded in our practices. There are clear affinities 
between the later Wittgenstein and Kant which are mirrored in the 
relativism that our holding for true, be it individual, collective or his-
torical-cultural, brings with it. Maria Baghramian, who looks at Witt-
genstein from the angle of pragmatism, insightfully remarks that
Wittgenstein seems to be arguing that all judgments can meaningfully arise 
only from within the context of a form a life, and that there is no possibil-
ity of standing outside all forms of life in the hope of making objective, 
external comparisons or offering criticisms of the comparative merits of 
various belief systems. (2008, 95)
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Wittgenstein’s biggest achievement was definitely the laying down 
of what he called a grammatical method, based on an investigation of 
our use of words in a variety of contexts. But his later remarks on hinge 
beliefs make us think about what is plainly cultural or personal and 
what is natural or ontological in our commitments.8  
Conclusion
We have travelled a long way in this article which has been aimed at 
understanding the development of the concept of assent. From the Stoics 
to Wittgenstein, there is a consistent attempt to shed light on our reason-
ing schemes through an examination of what it means to assent to some-
thing. Davidson’s notion of “holding true” is just one contemporary 
example of this epistemological legacy. The myriad of relations between 
the theoretical and practical spheres that this landscape makes visible 
urges us to look at moral and religious forms of assent as eminently cog-
nitive. In each situation, we give our assent to a multitude of elements 
and withhold other elements, sometimes based on solid criteria and other 
times simply lacking rational justification. But the main question is 
whether certain kinds of assent really leave us an alternative. One may be 
tempted to say that there must be such alternative. As Peter Klein explains: 
With regard to any proposition, say p, there are just three possible propo-
sitional attitudes one can have with regard to p’s truth when considering 
whether p is true. One can either assent to p, or assent to ~p, or withhold 
assenting to both p and ~p. (2002, 336)
However, if the later Wittgenstein is right in claiming that “some 
propositions are exempt from doubt”, that they “are as it were like 
hinges” upon which a series of other propositions turn (cf. 1969, §341), 
then the “pro-attitude” Klein sees in assent (cf. ibid.) appears as much 
less proactive. If p is a hinge proposition, one cannot help assenting to 
it. Assenting to ~p or simply withholding our assent are options that, 
for the hinge epistemologist, are not on the table, where a specific 
8 Pritchard (2016) talks exactly about “arational hinge commitments”, distinguishing between 
“über hinge commitments”/“über hinge propositions” and “personal hinge commitments”/“per-
sonal hinge propositions”.
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context is set.9 What remains to investigate, after we tread this path, is 
to what extent the moral and religious beliefs we express in multifari-
ous forms of assent have also this character of hinges. The present 
article was meant to clear the way for such an investigation.10 
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